Ramaswamy’s “national libertarianism” is a thinly veiled retread of pre-Trump economic orthodoxy.

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Last month, at the fourth annual National Conservatism Conference, former presidential candidate Vivek Ramaswamy delivered a thirty-seven minute speech outlining a political viewpoint he called “national libertarianism.” Ramaswamy contrasts this view with what he termed “national protectionism,” which he argues weighs the interests of workers and manufacturers above larger concerns of national security, national identity, and economic growth. In framing these three concerns and his larger philosophy of “national libertarianism,” Ramaswamy ignores the core economic issues raised by conservatives and harkens back to the failed, neoliberal, pre-Trump consensus.

Ramaswamy distinguishes his views from the “protectionists” on key policies under each of the areas of concerns listed above. On national security, Ramaswamy points to trade. While neoliberals, he argues, believe more trade supports a larger overall economic pie, and “protectionists” want to shield domestic manufacturers from foreign competition, Ramaswamy wants to sidestep that larger economic debate to talk about the national security implications of our strategic dependence on China. To “seriously” break this dependence, he argues, the U.S. will have to increase trade with other nations, such as Japan, India, Vietnam, and Mexico. Why? He doesn’t elaborate. Considering the industries he uses as examples—pharmaceuticals and semiconductors—it is unclear why India, Japan, or Mexico would have a “comparative advantage” in manufacturing these goods, especially when both industries were developed in the United States. (Note that this position defaults back to the “neoliberal” understanding that more trade or trade at current levels is good.)

In framing trade with China as a matter of national security, Ramaswamy fails to acknowledge the many trade abuses that have lured willing American companies to China in the first place: industrial subsidies, market access conditioned on joint ventures and technology transfers, currency manipulation, suppressed consumption, forced labor, and weak environmental protections. Should the U.S. ignore such practices? What do “national libertarians” think about the $800 billion trade deficit, especially as it relates to the budget deficit? Is it a problem that the U.S. has now sold off over $21 trillion in assets to foreign nations on net? Does opening our corporations’ labor market to the entire world increase feelings of national solidarity and build our middle class, or does it do the opposite? Globalism minus China is still globalism.

Even if one were to ignore the economic arguments on trade, warfare since at least WWI has entailed mass mobilization of entire economies. Wars are won on factory floors as much as on battlefields. Our capacity for war, and for the innovation that gives us strategic advantages therein, flow from an industrial commons that “free trade” ideology has hollowed out in the United States. Moving our supply chains a few miles south to Vietnam—a nonmarket economy that shares a border and extensive trade ties with China—will do little to increase our odds of winning any major conflict in the future. While China is a uniquely bad example of neoliberalism’s policy failures deserving of singular focus, America’s larger posture on trade and industrial policy must change if it is to remain on top in the twenty-first century.

Next, Ramaswamy raises the issue of immigration. “Opposing” neoliberals, who support unrestricted immigration as an economic issue, and protectionists, who want to restrict immigration as a labor issue, he again dodges the economic question of immigration altogether, focusing on national identity. He argues that the U.S. should administer a civics test for new citizens, end dual and birthright citizenship, and establish English as the national language, while rejecting “sloppy” caps on immigration levels. As long as Americans “consent” to the immigration levels (they don’t), immigrants share U.S. values (naturalization already requires a civics test, English test, and loyalty oath), and the government deports those who come illegally (he later walked this back), the doors should remain wide open. (Note that here, again, Ramaswamy subtly shifts back to the neoliberal understanding that more or current immigration levels are good.)

While the policies Ramaswamy proposes may sound “nationalist,” they would do little to address the main draws and costs of mass immigration, which will continue as long as American employers are not subject to mandatory E-Verify. Temporary work visas and low-skill immigration also allow employers to keep wages low instead of improving job quality, investing to increase productivity, and lobbying to improve the education system, while burdening taxpayers with increased education, health care, welfare, and policing costs. This weakens productivity, eliminates opportunities for American citizens, lowers wages, creates an underclass of workers in our economy subject to abuse, and entrenches class divides—all of which run counter to a healthy nationalism. Conservatives are also right to point out the imprudence of trying to absorb hundreds of thousands of new citizens per year into a country with no faith in its institutions. Legal mass immigration is still mass immigration.

Many in both the “protectionist” and libertarian camps would agree the U.S. should reserve spots for those at the very top of their fields who can help pull us out of our slump and put our house back in order; however, narrowing our view to such a group is naturally accomplished by looking at immigration through a strategic economic (“protectionist”) lens that distinguishes high- and low-skill immigration, rather than a “libertarian” one barely distinguishable from the status quo.

Lastly, Ramaswamy discusses economic growth and constitutionalism in the context of the administrative state. In his telling, the “protectionists” want to reshape and redirect the regulatory state toward the interests of workers and manufacturers, setting up a “right-wing nanny state,” while the “national libertarians” want to “Shut. It. Down.” He then lists several examples, including conservative support for Federal Trade Commissioner and anti-trust hawk, Lina Khan, arguing that federal regulators shouldn’t get to “pass judgement on what does or does not count as fair competition.” He also blames federal regulation for the poor performance of Boeing and the chemical spill in East Palestine, and takes issue with Sen. Hawley’s bill to cap credit card interest rates at 18%. (Note, again, that there is little recognizable distinction between his and the standard “free market” neoliberal view.)

Ramaswamy fails to address conservatives’ core justifications for these policies: fair competition and popular sovereignty. If Ramaswamy doesn’t want the government to decide what constitutes fair competition, who is supposed to do that? One of the core functions of the government is to protect property rights, but what constitutes property and a right to that property is established by law. For example, patents are essentially temporary monopolies protected by the government to incentivize innovation, and the government offers corporations limited liability to ensure entrepreneurs can run businesses without going to jail in the event of consumer injury.

National Conservativism, “Trumpism,” and the Tea Party movement all emerged out of a recognition that average Americans are losing their voice and respect in the national conversation. Conservatives recognize there are economic trends underlying this sentiment. Between 1972 and 2022, corporate profits per capita increased by 185%, GDP per capita by 141%, and productivity by 135%, but the average hourly wage for workers increased by only 1%. Similarly, while the top 10% of earners added $29 trillion in wealth between 1989 and 2019, the bottom 50% of earners lost wealth.

This consolidation of wealth rose alongside a consolidation of market power. Top passive index and exchange-traded funds like BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street now control over $21 trillion in assets. For context, the market cap of the entire S&P 500 is around $46 trillion and annual U.S. GDP is around $27 trillion. A paper published by Cambridge University Press found that, jointly, Blackrock, Vanguard, and State Street are the largest shareholder in 88% of S&P 500 firms and 40% of U.S. companies overall. This means a small concentration of economic entities can effectively steer the economy toward the interests of asset holders at the expense of productive investment, competition, and wages. It also facilitates political engineering through ESG and DEI requirements outside any system of accountability to voters.  

Like the administrative state, these dynamics underlying the modern economy are increasingly opaque to the average citizen, further undermining accountability. While Ramaswamy is right to point out the potential for government abuses and inefficiencies, and has sought to provide a market alternative to ESG investing, the market alone will not correct its own progressive structure, which threatens widespread prosperity and liberty as much as the administrative state. Corporate tyranny is still tyranny.

Ramaswamy rightly criticizes the neoliberal view for placing economic growth above national security and national identity, and for assuming capitalism would spread American values. But it is foolish to think deregulation, ending birthright citizenship, and selective decoupling from China will restore sovereignty to the American people and greatness to our nation. Ramaswamy begins his speech by praising President Trump for the “sense of energy and revival” he brought to the GOP by “offer[ing] an entirely new world view” instead of “blindly parrot[ing] the party’s historical orthodoxy with fancy verbiage wrapped around it.” What mattered to the average American was not the new and old “-isms” attending to Trump’s rise, but that, for once, someone seemed to understand and speak for them and their interests.

Reading between the lines, “parroting the old orthodoxy with fancy verbiage” seems to be exactly what Ramaswamy is doing here.

Mark A. DiPlacido
Mark A. DiPlacido is a policy advisor at American Compass.
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